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THE HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION ACT OF 1965:
A CASE STUDY IN LEGISLATIVE FRUSTRATION
By RICHARD D.

LAMM* AND STEPHEN

K.

YASINOW**

A growing national concern with billboards and other forms of
visual pollution resulted in the Federal Highway Beautification Act
of 1965. This article suggests that the legislation has had little
positive effect and may actually work against highway beautification, with two factors combining to tie the hands of those state
legislaturesthat seek to eliminate or reduce the number of billboards
on their highways. First, Congress has not appropriatedany funds
during the last two fiscal years to enable the Federal Government
to pay its 75 percent commitment; and second, the "just compensation" provisions of the act directly conflict with the laws of many
states, which provide for taking under the police power. Two
possible solutions to the problems are suggested: (1) Resort to
the courts for clarification of ambiguities in the act, and (2)
Amendment of the act by Congress to permit the states to elect
their own techniques by which to enforce federal standards.

T HE Congress

of the United States in the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 declared loftily: "[Tjhat the erection and
maintenance of outdoor advertising signs, displays, and devices in
areas adjacent to the Interstate System and the primary system should
be controlled in order to protect the public investment in such highways, to promote the safety and recreational value of public travel,
and to preserve natural beauty." 1
The subsequent history of the Highway Beautification Act indicates these goals have not been realized and that the act which proposed to control billboards serves as the single greatest impediment
in many states to passing effective billboard control legislation. 2
Professor of Law and Director, Student Practice Program, University of
Denver College of Law; Member of Colorado State Legislature, 1966 to Present;
B.B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1957; L.L.B. University of California at Berkeley,
1961.
** Second Year Student and Participant, Legislative Internship Program, University of
Denver College of Law; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1963; M.A., Georgetown
University, 1967.
'Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(a) (1965). Both Houses of Congress
expressed an awareness of a national billboard problem. In the Senate, roadside
advertising was referred to as "a creeping cancer" which creates "blighted corridors"
and makes the nation's highways "a huge and garish want ad." 111 CONG. REC. 23891
(1965) (remarks by Senator Dodd). The House also expressed a strong interest in
eradicating "the garish clutter symbolic of a crass commercialism," 111 CONG. REC.
26140 (1965) (remarks by Representative Wright) in order to create scenic corridors, 111 CONG. REC. 26276 (1965) (remarks by Representative Howard).
2 The Colorado Legislative Council made an inquiry of the fifty states. Replies were
were received from 37. Some sample replies: "The terrific administrative expense in
administering a program meeting the Federal requirements is a doubtful investment
on the public's part for the benefits derived therefrom." (Alabama) ;"The hindrance
encountered to date is a lack of participating Federal funds to implement the Federal
Act and State Legislation." (Maryland); "[It] has hindered our ability to enforce
*Assistant

437

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 46

The fate of the act serves as an excellent illustration of how the
legislative process can be subverted, in that a single section in legislation inserted by a clever lobby or overlooked in the political process
can render the legislation inoperative and in effect make it counterproductive.
The Highway Beautification Act of 1965 provides that any
state that the Secretary of Transportation determines has not provided for "effective control" of the erection and maintenance of
outdoor advertising along the interstate and primary highway system
would lose 10 percent of its Federal-Aid Highway allotment.3 The
Secretary is charged with the duty of setting certain national standards concerning the lighting, size, number, and spacing of signs'
and with setting standards of "customery use" which will allow
outdoor advertising in areas adjacent to the interstate and primary
system which are "industrial or commercial" either as zoned or when
meeting certain standards agreed upon between the Secretary and the
5
individual state.
The act provides that "just compensation" shall be paid for the
removal of all outdoor advertising and provides that the states
must pay 25 percent of the just compensation, which includes compensation to the owner of the billboard for the taking of his "right,
title, leasehold, and interest" in it. In addition, the property owner
on whose land the sign is located must be "justly compensated" for
the taking of his "right to erect and maintain" the billboard thereon.'
The act further stipulates that any billboard which is lawfully
in existence on September 1, 1965, and which is illegal under the act
(Illegal billboards are defined as signs other than official signs,
those which advertise the sale or lease of property, or which advertise
activities conducted on the premises. 7 ) does not have to be removed
until July 1, 1970. All other lawfully erected nonconforming signs
are not required to be removed until 5 years after they become nonconforming under the act." The compliance date for states to conform
to the Federal Act was set at January 1, 1968.' A 1968 amendment
our 1961 Act, due to the compensation factor and resulting delays occasioned by
several court injunctions filed in various Federal courts." (Washington). Legislative
Council Survey, Colorado General Assembly, Denver, Colorado, 1969, on file with
that agency [hereinafter cited as Survey).
3
Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(b) (1965).
'Id. § 131(c).
5 id. § 131(d). A 1968 amendment to this section provides: "Whenever a bonafide
State, county or local authority has made a determination of customary [commercial
or industrial] use, such determination will be accepted .
Federal-Aid Highway
Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(d) (1968).
6 Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(g) (1965).
7
Id. § 131(c).

OId. § 131(e).
Old. § 131(c).
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declared that no outdoor advertising shall be required to be removed
under the act until the federal share of the compensation to be paid
is available. 10
Two factors, both apparently unforeseen by even the sponsors of
the Highway Beautification Act, serve to severely tie the hands of
any state legislature which seeks to eliminate or reduce the number
of billboards on its highways. The first is the fact that no funds
were appropriated for 1968 or 1969 fiscal years by Congress to
enable the Federal Government to pay its 75 percent commitment. 1 '
The second factor is an opinion issued by the United States
Attorney General which discusses the "just compensation" provision
and declares "that Section 131 is to be read as requiring each state
to afford their 25 percent share just compensation as a condition of
avoiding the 10 percent reduction of subsection (b)."12
The effect of the inability or refusal on the part of Congress
to fund its 75 percent share combined with the Attorney General's
opinion that requires states to pay to take down billboards or risk
losing 10 percent of their Federal-Aid Highway funds, has produced
state legislative inaction and has had a negative effect on a state's
13
ability to independently seek to control outdoor advertising.
The effects of this impasse are becoming increasingly clear. The
outdoor advertising situation reported throughout the United States
ranges from "worse than ever" to reports of little change.14 Only
21 of the 50 states have enacted legislation or taken steps to comply
with the federal program and most of these already had effective
billboard legislation prior to the act. 5 More serious, states that had
legitimated billboard regulation through their police powers were
confronted with the possibility of losing their Federal-Aid Highway
funds unless they made provision for "just compensation" by amend10Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(n) (1968).
"The N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 42, col. 1. Since questions still exist concerning
which areas are commercial and industrial, no valid determination on the costs of
"just compensation" nationwide is yet available. However, estimates of the cost of
compensating sign proprietors are $558 million. Id. at col. 3. In 1968, while considering the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Senator John Sherman Cooper recognized

the fact that "a difficult fiscal situation" had imposed upon Congress "aresponsibility to reduce, wherever possible, authorizations as well as appropriations."

3 United States Code Congressional and Administrative News 3526 (1968). In
light of Senator Cooper's remarks, the authorization of $418.5 million for highway
beautification by the Federal Government appears highly unlikely.
12 Letter from Ramsey Clark, Attorney General, to John T. Connor, Secretary of Commerce, Nov. 16, 1966, on file with Highway department, State of Colorado, Denver,
Colorado (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Letter].
13Survey, supra note 2.
14The N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
15 Of the 21 presently complying states, 15 had previously enacted strong billboard
control legislation. These states are: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. The N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 42, col. 4.
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ing their laws.1 6 That the remaining states are not in compliance,
may reflect frustration or a lack of understanding on the part of
many state legislatures as to how to proceed on controlling outdoor
advertising.
The jurisdictions which have passed legislation in compliance
with the Highway Beautification Act show a great variance on
exactly what is "just compensation. ' 17 Many state laws provide that
"just compensation" means the full value of both the right, title,
and interest in the sign and in addition compensation to the owner
of the property for his right to erect and maintain signs thereon.1 8
Others provide for a combination of amortization and compensation.1 9 The dissatisfaction with the "just compensation" provision
is clear, judging from a number of state laws which provide that
compensation shall be paid "only when made mandatory by federal
law," and absent such a mandate, removal of billboards must be
effected by amortization without compensation. 0 The stilted language of Vermont's law evidences that legislature's frustration at the
just compensation provision. The law provides:
Compensation shall be paid upon the taking or removal of
outdoor advertising under this chapter only if, and to the extent
federal law, when in effect, requires payment of compensation for
the taking or removal of outdoor advertising on state highways as
a condition for payment to the21state of federal highway funds, and
the federal funds are available.

There are many reasons why a state may object to the "just
compensation" provision. There would appear to be no federal and,
in most states, no state constitutional requirement to pay "just compensation" either to the owner of the sign or to the owner of the
16Records of the Colorado Highway Department reveal that 23 states would have to
amend their laws. Records on file with the Highway Department, State of Colorado,
Denver, Colorado [hereinafter cited as Records].
17Jurisdictions which have instituted regulations conforming with federal standards
are: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii. Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. The N.Y.
Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 42, col. 4.
18See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 25-2501 (Supp. 1967); Mo. REV. STAT. § 226.500
(Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE § 17-22-5 (1967). See also Survey, supra note 2.
19See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 177.840(3) (1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 249-A
§ 11 (vi) (1969). The New Hampshire act provides:
In calculating just compensation to be paid to the owner of an advertising device required to be removed by reason of nonconformity with Section
5 of this chapter . . . it is intended that the five-year period of nonconforming use shall be considered as whole or partial compensation to said owner
for his loss. It is further intended that in calculating just compensation to
the owner of land for which rental compensation has been paid for the five
preceeding years, such rental income during the period of nonconforming
use be taken into consideration as whole or partial compensation.
Id. Ch. 249-A § 11. See also Survey, supra note 2.
20
See. e.g., ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, ch. 38 § 2719(7) (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, ch. 14 § 336 (Supp. 1969). See also Survey, supra note 2.
21 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, ch. 14 § 336 (Supp. 1969).
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land on which the sign is located." Under the Federal Aid Highway
Act of 1958, which granted a bonus to states which passed outdoor
advertising control, 25 states had passed legislation and signed agreements with the Secretary of Commerce, and of these, 23 chose to
use police power rather than eminent domain.2 3 Congress, therefore,
went against a large and growing body of law when it required
payment of "just compensation. 2 4
The reasons for the legislative decisions of these 23 states seems
clear and are reflected in the various State Supreme Court opinions
which upheld "police power" legislation. In New York Thruway
Authority v. Ashley Motor Court the New York court said:
[I]t is to be borne in mind that it was the very construction of the
Thruway which created the element of value in the land abutting
the road. Billboards and other advertising signs are obviously of no
use unless there is highway to bring the traveller within view of
them. What was taken by the regulation, therefore, was the value
which the Thruway itself had added 2to
the land and of this the
5
defendant cannot be heard to complain.

In Ghaster Properties,Inc. v. Preston, the Ohio Supreme Court
said:
In the instant case, the statutes only deprive an owner of a claimed
right to use his land to communicate with those using the highway
... . [A]ny such right to so communicate can be taken from the
landowner without compensation by the state for the purpose of
improving the highway as a means of passage for the public. 26

The Supreme Court of Vermont, upholding general billboard
regulation, in Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, quoted with approval from
an earlier case, saying:
It is obvious that something more is claimed than the mere right to
erect and maintain bill-board structures upon lands adjacent to the
highway. In its essence the right that is claimed is to use the public
highway for the purpose of displaying advertising matter. This
fact has been well stated by the Philippine Supreme Court which
said that "the success of bill-board advertising depends not so much
upon the use of private property as it does upon the use of the
channels of travel by the general public. Suppose that the owner of
private property -- should require the advertiser to paste his posters
upon the billboards so that they would face the interior of the
property instead of the exterior. Bill-board advertising would die
a natural death if this were done, and its real dependency not
v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ; St. Louis Poster Advertising Co.
U.S. 269 (1919); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago.
242 U.S. 526 (1917) ; St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235
Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761 (1913) ; New York

2Euclid

v. City of St. Louis, 249

Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566,
218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961); Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425,
200 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
23 Records, supra note 16.
2Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (g) (1965).
25 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566, 569, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640, 644 (1961).
26 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328, 333 (1964).
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upon the unrestricted use of private property but upon the unrestricted use of the public highways is at once apparent. Ostensibly
located on private property, the real and sole value of the billboard
is its proximity to the public thoroughfares. Hence, we conceive that
the regulation of billboards and their restriction is not so much a
regulation of private property as it is a 2regulation of the use of
the streets and other public thoroughfares."
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in General Outdoor Ad-

vertising Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, had this to say about the
right of private property:
The right asserted is not to own and use land or property to live,
to work, or to trade. While it may comprehend some of these fundamental liberties, its main feature is the superadded claim to use
private land as a vantage ground from which to obtrude upon all the
public traveling upon highways, whether indifferent, reluctant,
hostile or interested, an unescapable propaganda concerning private
business with the ultimate design of promoting patronage of those
advertising. Without this superadded
claim, the other rights would
28
have no utility in this connection.
Congress in requiring ".just compensation," then, apparently
made its own legislative determination, and rejected the police
power approach taken by the vast majority of state outdoor advertising legislation.2 9 In doing so it not only undercut the well established practice of regulating outdoor advertising through the police
power, but also raised two questions: first, what is "just compensation"; and second, can the Federal Government constitutionally
dictate not only the substantive end results, but also the procedural
means by which roadside beautification is to be achieved?
A study of the legislative history of the act shows that the
declared effect of the just compensation provision might be far different than that which Congress intended. The Administration bill
on highway beautification which was introduced into Congress in
May of 1965, authorized the use of state police power, not eminent
domain, for effecting the control of outdoor advertising. 0 But the
Committee on Public Works in the Senate amended the bill to require
"just compensation."3 1 It was explained that it was because the
act
was to apply to the primary road system as well as to the interstate,
113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527, 529 (1943), quoting from Churchill e al. v. Rafferty,
32 P.I. 580, 609, appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 591 (1918).
2 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799, 808, appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 543 (1935), appeal
dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936).
2 Representative Thomas Pelly remarked during the 1965 beautification bill debates,
that 36 states were already able to regulate outdoor advertising by use of their police
powers. 111 CONG. REc. 26306 (1965) (remarks by Representative Pelly). This
statement is consistent with the fact that 23 police power states had signed agreements with the Secretary of Commerce under the 1958 Highway Act. Records, supra
note 16.
s0 111 CONG. REC. 23797 (1965) (remarks by Senator Cooper).
s1Id.
2
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and to the billboard industry and small businesses which had advertised and developed with the primary roads for more than 40 years,
that compensation should be paid,8 2 even though it was acknowledged
that the zoning powers of the state had previously been used to
regulate that industry. However, it is clear that many Congressmen
thought the proposed legislation would allow the state to use the
police power if its own constitution permitted. Congressman Edmondson stated in response to a question: "There is no question
but what title I and title II specifically authorized stricter standards
by a state if a state wishes to have them, both as billboard control
and on the junkyard problem." 3 Many people interpreted the
Federal Act to merely make compensation available if states either
desired to pay compensation, or were forced by their own constitutions to do so." They assumed that the use of the state police
power to impose billboard control restrictions, which were the same
or greater than those imposed by the federal statute, would continue
to be available and would not impose an obligation to "justly
compensate" upon either Federal or state Government."5 For these
people the opinion of the Attorney General declaring that a state
risked losing its Federal-Aid Highway funds if it did not provide
"just compensation" came as no small shock. 6
When the beautification bill reached the floor of the Senate,
initial opposition focused upon the 25 percent "just compensation"
contribution of the states.3 7 It was urged that the highway beautification program, being a national one, should be fully financed
by the Federal Government.," Those in favor of total compensation
by the Federal Government argued that the states were not in the
position to accept such a heavy administrative and financial burden
as the bill proposed to put upon them. 9 (There are 41,000 miles
of interstate roads and 225,000 miles in the primary system,4" and
a federal report estimates the number of illegal signs outside commercial areas at 839,000.) 41 The fear was expressed by others that
payment made solely by the Federal Government would relieve the
32

Id.

at 23798.

Id. (remarks by Representative Edmunson).
34 See generally Hearings on S. 1467 Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Roads of the
Senate Comm. on Pub. Works, Beautification and Highway Safety Programs,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-101 (1967).
33

SS Id.

36 Letters, supra note 12.
27 111 CONG. REC. 23796 (1965)

(remarks by Senator Cooper).

38 Id.
30ld. at 23871 (remarks by Senator Robertson).
40
d. at 23874 (remarks by Senators Holland and Randolph).
41 The N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 42, col. 3.
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states of all responsibility and would "lead toward inflated compensation payments.

'

42

The proponents of state contribution were eventually successful
in retaining the 25 percent compensation burden provision. In
explaining the interrelated functioning of sections 131(e,f) of the
act, some members of the Senate strove to alleviate potential confusion on the part of the states legislatures when confronted by
what appeared to be an intolerable financial drain upon state
resources:
Whatever interest remains at the particular time the States
act to compensate them, they would be paid, but as the amortization
period advanced, of course, then their property interests would be
44
of less value.
And more precisely:
[A]II that can be compensated for is whatever remains of the leaseholds or the unamortized values, so that if, in fact, the billboard
has been completely amortized or the leasehold has expired, no
compensation will be paid under the bill.4 5
These comments go a long way in explaining the 5-year period
of nonconformance stipulated in section 131 (e) and what role that
period was intended to play in "just compensation." It was appar-

ently thought that partial or even full amortization of both sign
owner and property owner interests could be accomplished during
that time, thus making "compensation" as described in the act
partially or totally unnecessary.46 Viewed in a slightly different
perspective, a period of amortization could be seen as compensation; for that in essence is what the stipulated period of nonconformance accomplishes.
When one considers that amortization is a technique traditionally employed in phasing out a nonconforming use within the
police power function of zoning, 47 and that compensation as referred
to is classically spoken of in light of eminent domain, 4S the coupling
of a nonconforming time period with "just compensation" appears
incongruous and confusing- but only when examined out of leg42 111 CONG. REC. 23874 (1965)

(remarks by Senator Randolph).

4 Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(g) (1965).
44 111 CONG. REC. 23872 (1965)

(remarks by Senator Cooper).

45Id. (remarks by Senator Muskie). After looking through subcommittee testimony,
Senator Neuberger had noted "that the signboard industry [felt] that it [could]
amortize its investments in signboards in 5 years." Id. (remarks by Senator
Neuberger).
4Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(g) (1965).
47

See generally Katarincic, Elimination of Nonconforming Uses, Buildings, and
Structures by Amortization -Concept
Versus Law, 2 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1 (1963).
48DILLON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 555 (5th ed.

1911).
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islative context. Taking into account the existence of an extremely
vocal billboard industry lobbying for compensation, 4" and the fact
that in 1965, 36 states were able to regulate billboards by terminating without compensation, after allowing for amortization of
costs,5 ° it becomes clear that just compensation after a reasonable
period of amortization was the logical Congressional solution to
a perplexing legislative problem.
The correct and apparently Congressionally intended interpretation of section 131(g) is extremely important to the success
of the Highway Beautification Act. If "just compensation" means
"compensation" mitigated by "amortization" it could clearly result
in a somewhat more manageable federal and state expenditure,
while an interpretation requiring full compensation could not only
preclude Congress from ever funding the project, but could also
serve as an insurmountable impediment to other federal, state and
local beautification-through-zoning projects.
The Administration bill which was considered by the Senate
Committee on Public Works in May 1965, required that the Secretary of Commerce deny all highway funds to a state that did not
comply with its provisions.51 Strong opposition in the committee
itself, to the imposition of this severe 100 percent penalty, succeeded
in reducing it to a 10 percent forfeiture. 2
The issue of whether the selection of a method of billboard
control, previously left to the discretion of the states, can be taken
from them by the 1965 act is worth examination. In his letter to the
Secretary of Transportation, then Attorney General Ramsey Clark,
responding to criticism that the act left the states no alternative to
compliance, declared that an option did exist,- the states could
53
ignore the act and incur the 10 percent penalty of its provisions.
Attorney General Clark cited Massachusetts v. Mellon,5 4 wherein
a suit was brought which attacked the constitutionality of legislation
that provided matching funds to states for federally approved programs designed to improve maternal and child health care. By way
of dicta, the Court said:
Probably, it would be sufficient to point out that the powers
of the state are not invaded, since the statute imposes no obligation,
49 See generally Hearings on S. 2084 Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Roads of the

Senate Comm. on Pub. Worhs, Highway Beautification and Scenic Road Program,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 200-28, 278-353, 390-408 (1965).
50 111 CONG. REC. 26306 (1965) (remarks by Representative Pelly). This responsibility is currently the jurisdiction of the since established post of Secretary of
Transportation.
51
Id. at 23796 (remarks by Senator Cooper).
52 Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(b) (1965).
5' Letter, supra note 12.
54262 U.S. 447 (1923), overruled, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1965).
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but simply
extends an option which the state is free to accept or
55

reject.
Nor does the statute require the states to do or to yield anything. If Congress enacted it with the ulterior purpose of tempting
them to yield, that purpose may
be effectively frustrated by the
simple expedient of not yielding.56
The Attorney General believed that Oklahoma v. United States
Civil Service Commission5 7 was the case most nearly in point to the
present situation. In Oklahoma, the state objected to the discharge
by the Federal Government of a state employee, a member of its
highway commission, for a violation of the Hatch Act,5 a federal
law. The state had received a grant of federal highway aid, and
that grant was conditional on compliance with the Hatch Act. The
Court upheld the position of the Civil Service Commission, declaring: "While the United States is not concerned with, and has no
power to regulate, local political activities as such of state officials,
it does have the power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states should be disbursed."5 9
The distinguishing element between the two cases cited by
former Attorney General Clark and a case which could arise under
the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 is obvious. In Massachusetts,
matching funds for maternal and child health care were to be denied
where federally-approved programs designed for that purpose were
not utilized. 0 In Oklahoma, a state highway official could be dismissed by the Federal Government for violation of federal law,
where the Federal Government participated in highway development
in that state. 1 But under the 1965 Act, a state which refuses to
participate in a national program of beautification not only forfeits
Federal Government participation in the state's beautification effort,
i.e. a 75 percent share of compensation payments, but must also
sustain a 10 percent loss of federal funds for a defense-commerce
project, the construction of highways. Analagous to the situation at
hand would be a forfeiture of federal funds used in the construction
of a state's medical facilities as a result of the state's unwillingness
to comply with a federal program of recreation-area development.
The two contentions appear equally preposterous.
55262 U.S. 447, 480. (1923).
56Id. at 482.
57 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
8

5 Hatch Political Activities Act, 5 U.S.C. § 118 (1, k-n) (1964),

18 U.S.C. §§ 594-95,
600-01, 604-05, 608 (1964).
59 Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947).
°Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), overruled, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968).
61Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
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This inconsistency in the rationale of the penalty provision of
the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 was noted in the Senate:
[A]nd no state should be deprived of this assistance so necessary
to provide a complete nationwide system for commerce and defense
needs, by reason of not being able62to qualify as a member in good
standing of an extraneous program.
Still another Senator commented:
I do not know of any Federal-aid program, in existence or
proposed, with the exception of this bill, which requires States to
take legislative action and make appropriations under
penalty of
68
losing Federal-aid available under another program.

The issue thus arises as to what provision "violations" will bring
the 10 percent penalty into effect. The Attorney General's opinion"
declared that the "just compensation" provision was a condition of
avoiding the 10 percent reduction of section 131(b).
The major case to date interpreting the "just compensation"
section, " ' Markham Advertising Co. v. State, held that its language
was not mandatory and that Congress did not pre-empt the field but
left the states free to act." The court declared that Washington's
billboard control statute which used police power was therefore valid.
It stated:
Our examination of § 131, supra, leads us to conclude that its
essential operation is to condition payment of 10 percent of a State's
share of federal-aid highway funds upon the state's exercise of its
powers to regulate outdoor advertising in a manner consistent with
federal standards. We think that the purpose of the federal statute
is obviously to induce the States to act, not to require them to do so.
The statute allows the state to choose between foregoing 10 percent
of its allotment of federal-aid highway funds and compliance. If
Congress had intended . . . [it] to be mandatory on the states,

there would have been no need to attach a monetary penalty to
67
noncompliance.

The Markham case seems well reasoned and reflects the rule of
long standing that conflicts between Federal and state Governments
must be so "direct and positive" that the federal and state acts cannot
"be reconciled or consistently stand together."
State legislatures,
however, in other states still have to resolve the "compensation"
CONG. REc. 26252 (1965)

(remarks by Senator Berry).
Further substantiation of the fact that
two different programs were therein involved may be found in the fact that § 131 (g)
of the act, suggesting "just compensation," was funded for fiscal years 1966 and
1967 not from the highway trust fund but from the general fund. Id, at 23869
(remarks by Senator Randolph).
64 Letter, supra note 12.
62 111

63 1d. at 23798 (remarks by Senator Cooper).
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Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (g) (1965).
439 P.2d 248 (Wash. 1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969).
Southeastern Displays, Inc. v. Ward, 414 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1967).
eld. at 257.
68Id., quoting from Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1937).
66

See also
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problem, knowing that their states may have the penalty imposed
against them and that the courts may uphold the penalty in following
the reasoning of the Attorney General's opinion. 9 For these legislatures the question is not so much the odds but the stakes. The
traditional use of police power in this area will possibly deprive them
of a significant portion of much needed highway funds.
Thus, although the 1965 Highway Beautification Act, when
correctly interpreted to mean compensation after a period of amortization, permits compliance legislation which places a more reasonable
financial burden upon the state, the act has attempted to give
authority to the Federal Government to resolve problems previously
within state jurisdiction which were well on the way to solution by
state authorities. The zoning approach taken by the majority of
concerned states which drafted billboard control legislation prior
to the enactment of the 1965 act, contained no element of "just
compensation.'"

An amortization period was considered to be com-

pensation enough.7 1 State and federal court decisions consistently
upholding the constitutionality of zoning to control the spread of
billboard blight along the highways," furnish yet another reason
why the states have not assumed a position of ready compliance
to the 1965 act's "just compensation" provisions.
Congressional action, suggesting the use of eminent domain in
the billboard control area, seems ironic upon consideration of the
rapid emergence and acceptance of zoning as the police power tool
by which aesthetics as an element of general welfare, or in its own
73
right, can be protected by the states.
A common device by which zoning regulations actually based
upon aesthetics have been brought under the more traditional general
welfare umbrella, has been to declare that the promotion of aesthetics
69Letter, supra note 12.
70Records, supra note 16.
7
1Id.
72 Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ; St. Louis Poster Advertising
Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of
Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St.
Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911),

appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761 (1913);

New York Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176
N.E.2d 566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961); Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176
Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
IsEskind v. City of Nero Beach, 150 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1962), rer'd, 159 So. 2d 209

(Fla. 1963); Sunad, Inc. v. City of Saratoga, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960); Dade
County v. Gould, 99 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1957) ; Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861 (Fla.

1953); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364
(1941) ; State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967)

; City

of New Orleans v. Pergament, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953) ; City of New
Orleans v. Levy, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941) ; Town of Lexington v. Govenar,
295 Mass. 31, 3 N.E.2d 19 (1936) ; Cromwell v. Ferrier,
N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967); People v. Stover,
N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 '(1963); Ohio v. Buckley,
243 N.E.2d 66 (1968) ; Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 351,

19
12
16
400

N.Y.2d 263, 225
N.Y.2d 462, 191
Ohio St. 2d 128,
P.2d 255 (1967).
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will improve the economy and will thus benefit the general welfare. 74
In the Florida tourism cases, 7 5 zoning restrictions on billboards were
upheld where the economic health of the city's major industry
(tourism) was at stake, and therefore, the general welfare of the
community's inhabitants was endangered. Somewhat similarly, in
City of New Orleans v. Pergament70 and City of New Orleans v.
Levy,77 the preservation of areas of historic interest was deemed
to be sufficiently important to the city's economy, hence zoning
towards that end was upheld as legislating for the general welfare.
In 1963, in People v. Stover, 8 the New York Court of Appeals
wrote a landmark decision in the history of zoning. That case
involved an ordinance prohibiting the maintenance of clotheslines
in front or side yards abutted by a street. In the court's words:
[I]t is our opinion that the ordinance may be sustained as an
attempt to preserve the residential appearance of the city ....
Once it be conceded that aesthetics is a valid subject of legislative
concern, the conclusion seems inescapable that reasonable legislation designed to promote that end is a valid and permissible
exercise of the police power. 79
Making that concession, recognizing that the statute in question
was based on aesthetic considerations, the court concluded that the
ordinance was properly grounded on a proper exercise of the police

power.8 0
As momentous as the Stover decision was to the field of zoning

for aesthetics generally, equally momentous was the impact of
Cromwell v. Ferrier,1 another New York case decided in 1967 on

the specific issue of billboard zoning for beautification. The ordinance in Cromwell set forth a comprehensive plan for regulating
accessory signs, those related to a business located on the same lot,
and implicitly prohibiting all others.82 In discussing the validity of
74Eskind v. City of Nero Beach, 150 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1962), rev'd, 159 So. 2d

209 (Fla. 1963) ; Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960);
Dade County v. Gould, 99 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1957); Merritt v. Peters, 65 So.
2d 861 (Fla. 1953); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480,
3 So. 2d 364 (1941); City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d
798 (1953) ; City of New Orleans v. Levy, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941).
75 The Florida Cases include: Eskind v. City of Nero Beach, 150 So. 2d 254 (Fla.
1962), rev'd, 159 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1963) ; Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So.
2d 611 (Fla. 1960); Dade County v. Gould, 99 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1957) ; Merritt
v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1953); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland
Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 *(1941).
76 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941).
77223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953).
78 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42
(1963).
79 Id., 191 N.E.2d at 274, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
80
ld., 191 N.E.2d at 276, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 738-39.
81 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
82 Id., 225 N.E.2d at 751, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
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that ordinance, the court recognized that the primary objective of any
anti-billboard ordinance is an aesthetic one, and rejected the notion
that aesthetic objectives alone would not support a valid ordinance.8"
The court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance in question
and approved the enactment of legislation prescribing outdoor advertising, based primarily on aesthetic considerations. Billboard zoning
for aesthetics was thus confirmed as a proper function of the police
power.
Since the two New York decisions, other states have taken
similar strides in the same direction. In State v. Diamond Motors
Inc.,8 4 the court declared:
We accept beauty as a proper community objective, attainable
through the use of police power. We are mindful of the reasoning
of most courts that have upheld the validity of ordinances regulating outdoor advertising and of the need felt by them to find
some basis in economics, health, safety, or even morality .... We
do not feel so constrained. 8 5
In Ohio v. Buckley,"6 statutes which required junkyards outside
of a municipality to be obscured from the view of persons traveling
on the city's roads, were held a valid exercise of the police power
although they were based upon aesthetic considerations.8 7 Earlier,
the majority in Oregon City v. Hartke,8 8 joined Stover in its holding
that "aesthetic considerations alone [could] warrant an exercise of
the police power." 9 With such precedents established, it is not
surprising that today neither Ohio nor Oregon has fully implemented
the 1965 Federal Beautification Act, and that both are regulating
billboards by police power."
92
9
As shown by the recent decisions in Hawaii, ' New York,
Ohio,98 and Oregon, 4 the Stover decision in 1963 rather than
starting a trend in police power exercise - marked its culmination.
State legislatures, municipal zoning groups, and the judiciary, had
been promoting aesthetics through zoning for many years, cloaking
83Id., 225 N.E.2d at 753, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 27.

50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967).
85 Id. at 827. The state supreme court was butressed in its decision by the HAWAIIAN
CONST. art. 7, § 5: "The State shall have power to conserve and develop its natural
beauty, objects and places of historic or cultural interest, sightliness and physical
good order, and for that purpose private property shall be subject to reasonable
regulation."
86 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 163 (1969).
B'Id.
8

8240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1967).
89
1d., 400 P.2d at 262.
90Survey, supra note 2.
91
State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967).
2Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967);
People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).
9 State v. Buckley, 243 N.E.2d 66 (Ohio 1968).
94 Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1967).
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their intent in an argument based primarily on health,"5 safety,9"
public welfare,9 7 or morals." While aesthetics had remained well
hidden in the dicta of pre-Stover decisions, times had slowly changed
and the attitudes of people toward aesthetics had changed with
them.9 "
Whatever the reason for the ascendance of aesthetics, it appears
certain that beauty has finally acquired the mantle of legislative
and judicial respectability within the states. Were it not for the
highway beautification program of 1965, state legislatures could
clearly have a wide array of police power justification in preserving
beauty along our Nation's highways.
For the foregoing reasons, the majority of state legislatures
have not complied with the mandate of the Federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965. The fact that the Federal Government itself
is not able to perform its obligations under the act- pay its share
of compensation - has been a crucial factor in state noncompliance.
Confusion has arisen over antithetical provisions which join "just
compensation" and amortization concepts. Also, the act, in seeking
to create a national program of beautification, has established a
potentially dangerous precedent in threatening to withdraw a portion
of federal funds from one federal-state program for a state's noncompliance with another.
In addition, in the interpretation of the act, there exists great
confusion as to the effect of the term "compensation"; whether,
despite the Attorney General's opinion,1"' the nonexistence of a
direct and positive conflict between the Federal Act and an existing
state act,' 0 ' may still permit the state to operate under "stricter' '102
standards which utilize the police power?
5 See generally St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137
S.W. 929 (1911).
9

6Id. See also Los Angeles v. Barrett, 115 Cal. App. 2d 776, 315 P.2d 503 (1957)
In re Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961); New York
Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566.
218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961) ; Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200
N.E.2d 328 (1964).
97Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 150 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1962), rel/d, 159 So. 2d 209
(Fla. 1963), Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960); Dade
County v. Gould, 99 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1957); Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861
(Fla. 1953); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d

364 (1941) ; City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953) ;
City of New Orleans v. Levy, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941) ; Town of Lexington
v. Govenar, 295 Mass. 31, 3 N.E.2d 19 (1936).
98

See generally St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137
S.W. 929 (1911).

0The Oregon supreme court described that change in attitude as "a reflection of the
refinement of our tastes and the growing appreciation of cultural values in a maturing
society." Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1967).
100 Letter, supra note 12.
101Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 439 P.2d 248 '(Wash. 1968).
102 Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131(e) (1965).
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Finally, courts have for many years recognized the constitutionality of controlling the billboard problem through zoning.1 °8 Suddenly, the application of eminent domain principles may be demanded
of the states by an ambiguous federal act. The reaction of state government is understandably one of confusion.
Although the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 has generated
much confusion, the act should not "join Prohibition in the Federal
annals of noble experiment. ' 10 4 For the motivation of the Administration and the legislators who drafted and enacted it was one of
an urgent interest in controlling our environment and preserving
our Nation's heritage of natural beauty. A solution to this frustrating
situation would be to amend the act to permit the states to elect their
own techniques by which to enforce federal standards, thereby transforming the highway beautification program into an effective, truly
federal effort. A return to the incentive system as presented in the
1958 Federal-Aid Highway Act, 105 but with an incentive offered to
the states in the form of any needed highway beautification funds,
could be an innovative aspect of that amended act.
Should amendment to the 1965 Act not be made by the current
Congress, resort to the courts for clarification of ambiguities of the
act will be necessary. A declaratory judgment action by a state official
asking the court, under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act,"0 6
to determine whether there is a conflict between the Tenth Amendment 10' and the Attorney General's interpretation of section 131(g)
of the 1965 Act would be brought. Such a course of action would
probably involve extensive litigation, during which time noncomplying states, enforcing billboard controls by locally determined procedures, would be doing so under threat of penalty. It appears clear,
then, that this confusing situation may be most expediently resolved
by the Congress through its amendment procedures, and that it
should be the Congress, therefore, that solves the problem which it
has created.

103Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); St. Louis Poster Advertising Co.
v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919) ; Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago,
242 U.S. 526 (1917); St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis,
235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761 (1913); New

York Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d
566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961); Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St.
425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964).

104The N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 42, col. 7.
105 Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 122(c) '(1958).
106 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964).

107U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL
46

VOLUME

SUMMER

1969

NUMBER

3

Member, National Conference of Law Reviews
BOARD OF EDITORS
DENNIS

J.

FALK

Editor-in-Chief
THOMAS

J.

ALAN G. CLAUSEN
Managing Editor

BURKE, JR.

JOHN S. LEPARD

HOWARD

L.

FRANK

J.

BECK

Assistant Managing Editor

KAREN METZGER

H.

ARTHUR

ROBINSON

BOSWORTH

II

Business Editor
PAT M. SERNA

RICHARD F. MAURO
Symposium Editor

Note Editors

G. LANDON FEAZELL, JR.
Chairman 16th Nat'l Conference of Law Reviews
STAFF
T.

L.

EDWARD

E.

VANCE
BRUCE

B.

DARRYL

J.

DAVIS

DAVID

FELSING

HENRY L. SCHINMAN

HALVORSON

MARTIN

JOHNSON

G.

T. MoRRow
T. O'MALLEY

HUBERT

MICHAEL CARRINGTON

WINTHROP

H.

KENNETH

KANEKO

SHORE

R.

STETTNER

S CHANDLER VISHER

PETER KEPPLER

STEPHEN K. YASINOW

P. N/.NDA
Faculty Advisor
VED

The Law Journal is pleased to announce the election of the following editors for
1969-1970: Darryl G. Kaneko, Editor-in-Chief; Howard J. Beck, Managing Editor;
Winthrop J. Davis, Assistant Managing Editor; Vance E. Halvorson, Note Editor;
Bruce B. Johnson, Business Editor; Martin H. Shore, Associate Editor. S. Chandler
Visher, Associate Editor.

